ABSTRACT This paper examines the tensions and paradoxes that arise during the life course of research groups as they strive to establish and maintain an identity, acquire and retain control of an ensemble of research technologies, and evaluate and choose the risks they are willing to accept in their work. My central aim is to rekindle interest in the ambivalences, tensions, and paradoxes of science by identifying and illustrating the tensions that characterize research groups. Among the questions of concern are: How does a group establish an independent identity while remaining connected with its field of research? How are consistency of focus and continuity of approach balanced against the freedom younger scientists need to develop as independent investigators? What varieties of risks are encountered in research and how are they evaluated and navigated? Based on intensive, repeated, face-to-face interviews with scientists at various levels of seniority at elite private and public universities, the paper examines the choices leaders make at these critical junctures and the consequences of those choices. Several sorts of tensions are examined, including autocracy versus democracy, varieties of risk, role conflicts, openness versus secrecy, competitive cooperation, ambivalences about priority claims, and balancing continuity and change, and their implications for science, scientists, and the research process are discussed.
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certain way, and you get answers that are not any more significant than what anyone else is doing or has gotten, but they're different, there's a quirk about them that's a little bit different from what the next person's doing, and they probably feel the same way, that the specific way they're attacking a certain problem is different enough that there's not competition. (An assistant professor interviewed within 2 years of his group 's inception, private university, 1992) A new lab strives to establish its identity by creating an ensemble of research technologies that can produce acceptable yet distinctive answers to research questions that are original and important for the field, yet connected to existing streams of inquiry. 4 Such technologies both produce publishable results now and create the means and circumstances for doing so in the future. They shape the group and position it within the field, imparting momentum and creating an operational and symbolic identity. From the outset group leaders navigate among competing desiderata. The assistant professor quoted above asserts that a group's work is intrinsically original, but that alone is not sufficient to establish a workable research identity in the field. He goes on to explain that his group is: still sort of searching, I think, for the real, focused question that we want to address . . . . That's when you see your insecurities . . . . Only by talking about it, kind of exploring it, reading the literature exhaustively, and doing experiments do you really figure out what aspect of it is most exciting, both to the people out there and also to you. We're still in the midst of trying to sort that out. (Junior scientist, private university, 1992) Identity has both nominal and evaluative aspects, and the process of searching for exciting research problems can be precarious, involving 'a perennial problem' of coping with failed experiments. It is a process that takes place over time and involves significant investments and precarious predictions about the course that a line of inquiry will take. For example, to arrive at 'a solid project' for a graduate student in the lab, the student and lab head explored: two other questions that sort of ended up in dead ends. One he and I recognized was a dead end, went nowhere. It was a simple case where we were mapping a gene that seemed to be important for something, and it turned out we couldn't map it. Genetically, that means that it's not one mutant locus, there's several different mutations that only in combination are causing that phenotype. That makes it a bit intractable and less interesting for technical reasons and also for scientific reasons. So it was obvious there was a problem there, so it got dropped . . . . It took about 3 months [to try to map the genes, learn that it couldn't be done, and decide to drop the problem]. (Junior scientist, private university, 1994) [The other] was a hard experimental idea that I sort of was developing, and the student took it, and through his urging we dropped it . . . . I hadn't fully thought through how really difficult the approach was, but also, if it was successful, I hadn't thought through the kinds of things we would do once we had that technology working well, and whether I wanted to do those kinds of things, because it would lead us in a certain direction. So we didn't have a crystalline idea of what we were going to do with it, and I kind of wanted to hold onto it and keep trying, and he kept bugging me, saying: 'Even if it works, what really will we do?' And I didn't have good answers, so we talked about that for a long time, then he dropped it with an understanding between us that he would drop it and move on to something else. So that was a case where . . . I didn't know to drop it . . . . These are hard questions, recognizing dead ends. (Junior scientist, private university, 1994) The first candidate problem lacked parsimony, theoretical relevance, and technical tractability: it was not 'doable' (Fujimura, 1987 (Fujimura, , 1996 , though they did not know this at the outset. The second problem was doable, publishable, and difficult, but had a subtle deficiency: 'even if it works' it did not promise enough other doable (or fruitful) problems to form a durable identity. Reputation based on publications is only one part of a group's identity and only one influence shaping its prospects. Equally important are what the group is capable of doing, where its research is going, and what is available in that sphere of inquiry.
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The quest for identity is perilous because it is based not only on accomplishment, but also on developing a capacity to accomplish, which depends on evaluating the research prospects of an unfolding and uncertain future. With his initial research grant a new assistant professor first tried to build a system to study recombinant events in human cells, and justified his undertaking this risky endeavor by saying that he would 'rather wrestle a gorilla than play around with monkeys'. But after 2 years' work for himself and a postdoc the system remained confounded by methodological artifacts (because it used polymerase chain reaction [PCR] , which itself may cause recombination), so with great reluctance he decided to try something different. Abandoning the recombination study was: almost like a divorce: sometimes you feel better after a divorce, but going through it is kinda hell . . . . The worst thing in the world, at least for me, is being indecisive. I can live with any decision, but not knowing one way or another is very difficult. So when you're mulling over whether or not to give up a certain project, that's difficult. You have to know when to give up . . . we may have hung on too long. (Junior scientist, private university, 1992) He reoriented his group to work with a new ensemble of research technologies, centered on a transgenic mouse with a mutated major histocompatibility locus, which combined molecular biology, traditional genetics, and delicate surgical manipulation of the ova of pseudo-pregnant mice. Despite substantial investment of time and resources, this system also did not respond as anticipated and he was unable to do much publishable research with it. This was the 'high risk, high reward' science that is so prominent in the rhetoric of funding agencies, and had it succeeded he would have had a unique and valuable research system. Yet reactions from colleagues and agency officials conflicted: they 'are glad to have me do it, but they look at me as if I'm crazy to try'.
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The risks and their consequences are quite real. His appointment at the university ended when the grant money was spent, so he left for a job at another university and developed research interests closer to medicine than to basic biology. Publication and citation data retrieved from the Science Citation Index® show a striking difference in performance: the 4 years of work devoted to building two initial ensembles of research technologies produced seven papers that received (by June 2004, about 10 years after publication) just 37 citations. In contrast, the 4 years spent working on a more medically oriented problem yielded five papers that were cited 211 times.
The need to preserve the clarity and distinctiveness of nascent research identities shapes relationships among research groups led by junior scientists. For example, early in their careers two group leaders who had known one another since their postdoctoral years were studying similar aspects of development. Employed at the same university with laboratories located along the same hallway, their groups served as technical resources, sounding boards, and foils for each other. But when asked if this closeness and commonality led to research collaboration, one scientist said yes, the labs did collaborate, then immediately corrected himself:
No, it's not a collaboration. It is mostly an intellectual collaboration. It's very important for us young people to keep things separated for many different reasons. First, because you want to get your identity, and also because it's very easy to get into conflict, even if it's not conflict between the people [that is, the lab heads], it's conflict between the students in the labs . . . . We [the two lab heads] have very different perspectives in life: he's very systemic, I'm much more mechanistic. Even though it seems we do very similar types of experiments, the goals are very different. I try to see how things work in a very mechanistic way. I try to go down as much as possible. He wants to look at a much broader level . . . . We benefit a lot from each other, but there is no overlap. The opportunity never came that we could be authors on each other's paper. There was never a real collaboration, although we knew exactly what everybody was doing in each other's lab, we have common group meetings, and we talk all the time together . . . . It's an ideal situation, I would say. (Junior scientist, private university, 1992) The groups formed a 'para-collaborative' relationship that involved a sort of working alongside one another that offered many of the benefits of collaboration with no need to share credit or entangle identities. In such relationships an early-career investigator balances interdependence and independence: having escaped the orbit of the postdoctoral advisor, the new lab head strives to maintain independence, yet needs trusted assessors to evaluate findings and ideas (Mullins, 1973; Chubin, 1975) , foils to shape identities, and empathetic colleagues to talk with about the day-today challenges of research. Para-collaborations provide such things, and when institutionalized they may become semi-formal scientific events, such as the bi-weekly 'tri-lab' meetings at one university that brought more than 20 groups (about 75 people) together for a pair of 30-minute research presentations by graduate students and postdocs, followed by lively and diverse critique.
Filter-Feeding and Escape Velocity
A properly structured lab will bring people in that can help keep the expertise growing. A properly structured university will do that for you, too . . . . You've got to constantly change techniques . . . . The postdoc I did got me introduced to molecular biology. But then when I came here I had to bring people in that would explore cell biology, protein chemistry; we had to take on new methods, such as transplanting genes back into whole organisms. You have to keep sticking your neck out to do things you're not used to doing, in order to stay current. It's not possible to go off and retool every few years; that's not a very useful way. It might be necessary if there's not enough flux in the lab, if you don't bring colleagues in that have the opportunity to try new things or make new connections with colleagues at the university, or come with different expertise . . . . Somebody will come in with cell biology, and we'll be happy to have them. Because most of what's going on (in the lab) is molecular biology, they'll quickly get that, which is what they come here for. But the people doing molecular biology will have the benefit of a colleague that has a great deal of expertise in cell biology . . . . So the new person may only do 10% cell biology when they come here, but the expertise is 100% because it gives exposure to the rest of the group. (Senior scientist, private university, 1992) Research groups are filter feeders. Graduate students, postdocs, and technicians pass through groups, contributing labor, skill, and ideas while acquiring publications, techniques, research acumen, and access to spheres of inquiry. Their chief aim is to attain sufficient 'velocity' to escape the orbit of the lab head and establish independent careers. During their training, scientists may work in several research groups, perhaps first as part of an obligatory graduate school rotation that gives a few months' experience in a variety of research settings, then as a research assistant working on a dissertation, and finally as a postdoctoral fellow, research associate, or the like. Postdocs join labs for periods ranging from 1 or 2 years up to 5 years or more, with a few becoming permanent members of the group. Technicians may be regular (career) employees of the university, or they may be research students pausing between their undergraduate years and graduate or medical school. To estimate of the amount of flux within groups, I examined personnel records at a one elite, private research university. Over a 14-year period, on average more than 30% of all research group members had been with their group for less than 12 months. Moving on is in the nature of being a graduate student or postdoc, and many lab technicians were young baccalaureate scientists on their way to graduate or medical school. 6 Thus, groups are more-or-less stable and continually changing, they are characterized by both solidarity and centrifugal forces, and their members contribute to and take from the group.
From this flow of graduate students and postdoctoral scientists a group leader must fashion a coherent research program, develop cooperation and teamwork, and sustain an array of techniques and tacit understandings. Groups are a dynamic microcosm of Kuhn's 'essential tension': they maintain continuity of research technology and expertise amid changing personnel, and produce original research ideas and results despite unchanging leadership and path dependent research technologies. Rheinberger (1997: 75) uses the term 'reproduction' to describe the process of maintaining stability in the experimental system amid change in personnel, results, and environment. Filter feeding is the social complement of reproduction, providing the continual, incremental freshening of a group's membership and capabilities that expands the boundaries of its sphere of inquiry. Doing so, in turn, not only enhances the prospects for originality in questions addressed and results produced, but also increases the time and freedom from competition necessary to do the work. David Hull suggests that research groups are like 'demes, the freely interbreeding populations of evolutionary theory. Within the informal social context created by the group, ideas may be modified and transmitted much more rapidly than they can through the formal channels of the more extended scientific community ' (1988: 22-23) . While 'freely interbreeding' may underestimate the amount of inertia within a group, the need to simultaneously reproduce and refresh their ensembles of research technologies accurately represents this essential tension.
Early-career scientists trying to establish research groups are at a special disadvantage in the feeding process because the best-qualified postdocs, whose skills, ideas, and energy are valuable to a group, often prefer to work with established, even eminent scientists. At the precise moment when a new lab needs creative thinking, innovative technique, and scientific energy to build its signature research system, people with such qualities are difficult to attract.
7 Etzkowitz (1992: 41) quotes a scientist who put the dilemma quite starkly: 'Until now I have sort of felt like . . . any postdoc who would want to work for me, I wouldn't really want to have.' 8 New lab leaders often hire postdocs who have significant scientific deficiencies. One was frustrated by her inability to find postdocs who could be 'full discussion partners' in research, and needed to look elsewhere to engage in scientific discussions of ideas and results (hence 'para-collaborations' and other patterns of interaction arise). 9 Other postdocs have serious limitations, such as one characterized as: a very odd bird, a very strange fellow. I had some money because I had this grant. The project wasn't going too well. So I just hired him because I figured he would work hard. And it was awful. He really, as far as I could tell, never understood what was going on at all. But he did work incredibly hard. It's the kind of situation I never want to get into again. It made some sense at the time because I needed to get this thing done, he clearly had the background to do it, he said he wanted to come and work hard . . . . He really kept to himself . . . and just kept beetling away. (Junior scientist [now senior], private university, 1999)
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Others explained in some detail how the abilities of their postdocs were offset by significant weaknesses:
One of the common ones is lack of initiative . . . intellectual initiative. They come with the attitude of a technician. They will do a perfect experiment -or, will try to do the most perfect experiment they can do -[but] they will not ask 'Why this experiment?' . . . They want me to tell them what to do. [Others have] plenty of ideas but don't think critically. Then there are those who cannot carry the experiment out technically. The idea is perfect but the execution is not solid. (Junior scientist, private university, 2000) Some people, for whatever reason, can't do an experiment. Any experiment. It's not a matter of being lazy . . . . Some people just can't design an experiment. They can't set up the controls, can't think through what they're doing properly. So they'll work on something for 2 months, then it'll be clear there was some flaw in the initial formulation, the approach. They're never going to be able to do an experiment in the classical sense . . . . They become technicians. (Junior scientist, private university, 1999) Can this be remedied through further education or training? university, 1999) To evaluate this claim I examined the group's publication and citation record for the years in question (from Science Citation Index®). From 1991 to 1999 the lab head published 43 papers, including articles, reviews, and a correction/addition, but excluding abstracts and a general-interest health article. The four key postdocs he named appear on 31 of those 43 papers, which received a total of 1790 citations as of June 2004, accounting for 72% of the papers and 77% of citations. Clearly, those few were indeed substantially responsible for the group's success, and their pattern of coauthorships is also striking. Overlapping somewhat in time and sharing lab space, the postdocs probably worked together in various ways. But their publications are overwhelmingly coauthored bilaterally with the lab head, with technicians and graduate students as additional coauthors of most publications. In this group, the leader filtered effective colleagues from the flow passing through the group and complemented their efforts with his own, creating a work organization that squeezed 'full papers out of people that have only fractional papers in them' (Price, 1986: 160) .
For junior scientists who are leading laboratories, some postdocs are incomplete, some uncomprehending, others incompletely integrated into the group, and still others contribute less than their fair shares. Only a few F i r s t P r o o f become 'full discussion partners' who produce trustworthy data and participate fully in research. The first two types challenge the leader with problems of complementarity and potentially wasted investment, while the last type poses problems of control, as we shall see below.
Artisan or Manager: Dilemmas of Craftwork and Control
I do work in the lab myself, still. That, I find, is really important, because that keeps me around during the day, so I can see things that are happening. You know, you can sort of see if people are having problems . . . . (Junior scientist, 1992) I don't work at the bench. I work at the bench today for the first time in 3 years (laughs) . . . . I think it's a question of opportunities and also philosophy and also, if you want to have a big lab you need to find the money for this big lab. In order to do that you need to spend a lot of time to doing that, and also you have to subcontract a lot of the work. (Junior scientist, 1992) Craft skills are important to those scientists who decide, as a matter of principle or preference, to remain committed to small-scale, hands-on research. By working with his or her own hands, a scientist retains sentient knowledge of the research subject, a knowledge that is experiential, embodied, or etched in the senses (Zuboff, 1988: 61-70) and that forms the foundation for developing embodied judgment (erfahrenheit) (Fleck, 1979: 96; Rheinberger, 1997: 77) . For example, a full professor kept her lab small so she could continue to work almost daily at the bench because 'my ideas come from actually doing experiments or looking specifically at the raw data of people in the lab. Without that, just sitting here in my office and reading papers, I don't think I would generate as many crazy ideas as I do'.
Craft skills are also essential to start, sustain, and (sometimes) guide a research group. As the group's prime mover, a new leader may spend significant time at the bench, both to do research and to achieve control of the group and its developing research technologies. Regardless of pedigree or prior accomplishment, the most immediate, salient, and convincing basis of a junior scientist's authority is his or her ability to produce strong, clean results at the bench. Borrowing a term used by jazz musicians, one scientist explained that he needed to 'show his chops' at the bench to establish his credibility with members of the lab. And the leader of a structural biology group motivated his postdocs to work hard by simply stepping in at night (without warning or comment) to complete the work of those who lagged behind. Craft skill is a powerful leadership tool, and its obsolescence may undermine control.
Some analysts of science contend that 'to focus too closely on technical expertise [what I have been calling craftwork] is to miss the forest for the trees. The main skill of the working scientist is not in bench manipulation but in experimental design, in research strategy and tactics' (Charlesworth et al., 1989: 158) . Accordingly, it is well established that leading a lab requires 'articulation work': managing people, ordering supplies, remaining in touch with collaborators, competitors, and funding agencies, and the
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like (Fujimura, 1996) . Time spent on such activities draws the lab head away from the bench. But to focus too little on craftwork ignores the essential tasks that produce scientific results and knowledge, and the relationship between research management and craftwork is richer and more organic than a simple choice or developmental outcome.
If lab heads do not remain active in hands-on research, their skills erode, potentially diminishing their authority and credibility with grads and postdocs, who may say of them that: they don't know what it takes to do an experiment any more. How long it takes, what the inertia is to actually do it, what the worries are about having it just technically work . . . . I don't want people in this lab to feel that I'm removed from the experimental situation. So that's one idealistic reason I do work in the lab. The selfish reason is because I like it . . . . About 2 years ago there was 1.5 extra people in the lab, and that I found psychologically very demanding, very hard to actually do experiments myself, and I like it much better now [with six other people in the lab]. (Junior scientist, private university, 1994) Withdrawal from craftwork occurs gradually over time, culminating in a symbolic moment or object that marks this watershed in a scientist's career. For example, some explained how they reduced their time in the lab from parts of semesters to summers, then to a few summer weeks, then to virtually nothing at all. Another pointed to the bookcase that now concealed the door leading directly from the office into the lab: ready access to the lab had become less valuable than space for some extra books. Yet another recalled the last experiments she did, the last published graphs that resulted from her own work. Every scientist I interviewed could remember the moment or event that marked withdrawal from the lab. Perhaps the strongest evidence for the value of craftwork is that many senior scientists still did something, even a menial task, to keep a hand in the lab's work. A National Academy of Sciences member, for example, continued to extract rat brains for the lab simply because he was very good at it. Another senior scientist prepared photographs for publication, claiming that he did it better than anyone else in the group. Underlying such efforts to retain craft skill and routine contact with the group is a tacit acknowledgement of the problems of continuity and control that may arise when the leader becomes too far removed from the lab. For example, when a postdoc produced a potentially significant finding, then moved on before the experiment was completed, a lab head found that:
There was nobody in the lab able to do those experiments so I had to go and do them myself for a while. Then . . . a student came and he worked on it with me, and we basically finished the material so that we could publish it together. (Junior scientist [now senior], private university, 2000) She had also pioneered a difficult new technique that worked in her hands and seemed to represent the future of her lab: at this time, with her own hands, she continued to impart technical momentum to the group. In F i r s t P r o o f contrast, when asked 7 years later if she still did experiments, she laughed: No, no, no, no She could point almost to the moment and the results that marked her transition from lab work:
In '95, '96 I was still really doing experiments, really big experiments, like screening libraries or doing things that ended up in papers, figures in papers. I think the last paper that we have that contains one of my experiments is from '97, there's a Nature Genetics paper that still has a gel that I did. And at that point I was still better in the lab at doing that than anybody else. But now, since then, I really haven't. I tried now and then, but I haven't really done anything serious at the bench. And the people in the lab now wouldn't even believe that I can do an experiment. They've never seen me at the bench. During an interval of just 3 or 4 years she lost the craft skills that had enabled her to pick up and complete an experiment, to lead by example, and to produce publishable results on her own.
Some scientists incur no discernible cost from leaving the lab bench and its flow of sentient knowledge. Another leader deemed withdrawal from the lab essential for the group to 'progress', a shift accompanied by some insecurity but no real loss of control. 
happen then you're dead. You can't make any progress. If you can't allow people to be better than you, and to bring in new techniques, and to develop new things that you just have no idea about. If you can't do that, you get stuck in science. You get stuck with one technique. You can't make any progress. (Junior scientist [now senior], private university, 2000) Despite confidence in her scientific judgment and ability to retain control, the pursuit of 'progress', the continual freshening of the ensemble of research techniques, and the sheer volume of possibilities (and postdoctoral applicants) that accompany successful opening research sphere posed challenges:
I have to be careful to not scatter out in the size of the lab, because I can't think about that many projects at the same time productively. So I think now it's a little bit too big. I can feel that I can't quite keep up with that many. But it's not too diverse in terms of themes or techniques at all. They're all pretty much using the same techniques, they're just techniques I don't know about, I've never done. I've never done any immunofluorescence microscopy. Never done it. Works great! All our papers depend on this technique. We're supposed to be one of the experts in the world on this technique and, you know, I've never done it. It's fine, it's not a problem. I see that scope often enough, you know, looking at the data, but I don't do the actual experiment. I look at the result. While some leaders may seem to cede some control, perhaps because control becomes built into the ensemble of research technologies used in the lab, others are challenged by the increasing variety of substantive work that accompanies growth. For them success and growth bring a new challenge: a more subtle thing, which is recognizing someplace where you're not sure your interest takes you. If you have five people in your lab -which is not a lot of people, but it's the number that I like . . . and you have a few different problems going on in the lab, which I have, you worry all the time about whether or not you're spread too thin, and each person, if they're doing good work, is developing questions that could be pursued single-mindedly, yet they're pursuing two or three of them. That's too much. So how do you figure out which of those two or three to forget about, just literally leave it alone and don't do any more on it? No one's very good at that, and we're not very good at that. (Junior scientist, private university, 1993) A senior scientist echoed this concern about the loss of control, accepting that the loss is: my own fault in the sense that I have too many projects going, so that I can't really do one of them myself very consistently. I don't even learn the technique as well as the people doing it . . . . There's a tendency to get removed from the lab, except through postdocs and graduate students. That can be unsettling too, in the long run. (Senior scientist, public university, 1992) Maintaining an identity is an ongoing process, not a one-time accomplishment, and it must be done in the face of many challenges: continual change in the ensemble of research technologies and the leader's understanding of them, a changing group of increasingly competent and independent-minded young scientists, successful experiments and an opening research sphere. Articulation work, which is essential for the control of people and materials and for the procurement of intellectual and other resources for the group, is not the opposite of craftwork or a higher form of science, but instead exists in a changing balance with craftwork. Throughout the group's life, course leaders are challenged to sustain a workable balance of involvement in the lab and with the wider world, and their authority depends in substantial measure upon their success in doing so.
Conundrums of Control
Telling someone what to do is taboo. The greatest man in science cannot tell the lowest what to do. (An experimental biologist interviewed by Warren Hagstrom, 1965: 106) We're the only master after God in our lab. We can do -I wouldn't say life and death, but almost -we really pronounce a lot about what's going on in the lab. (An experimental biologist interviewed by the author in 1992)
Control is of the essence of science. Materials, both animate and inanimate, are controlled and manipulated to produce phenomena to study. Control of research technologies produces measurements and inscriptions from phenomena. Experimental controls -that is, members of the control group -are compared with subjects to determine if the treatment had an effect. And by strategically imposing a series of controls an experimenter strives to exclude rival explanations. But the control of scientists' work by scientists or others remains a vexed issue in flux.
Some leaders use persuasion of varying intensity to guide their group's research trajectory by encouraging preferred directions and verbally pruning undesirable offshoots. One senior scientist used negotiation and peer pressure to shape the research of new junior colleagues:
People come to join your lab to work on your project, this is for sure. So in this regard you have total control on your project. Now, they come with a specific frame of mind and you're not going to tell them 'You're going to do that . . . . ' [When] somebody joined my lab, for example, I first talked to him for 2 or 3 hours when I convinced him to come. Then I don't tell him, 'You're going to do that'. I say, you're going to first talk to the different people [in the lab], and spend like 2 or 3 days spending a few hours with each of the persons. (Senior scientist, private university, 1992) Postdocs say that this lab head is 'very good at selling projects to people. He's usually able to talk people into doing what he wants them to do without pulling rank. He sells it to you so you believe in it when you do it. ' Junior or senior leaders may subscribe to a permissive, participative leadership style because it honors the traditional principles of independence in science. For instance, one junior lab leader who kept his group small and his hands-on involvement high, settled disagreements about lab strategy not by fiat, but 'by muddling through, and doing a little of both things for a while, because you don't know how to make a clean, hard decision . . . . Eventually, something gets a little bit more exciting and then it's easy to drop something else.' In contrast, another lab head of similar seniority devoted his time to writing, analysis, and presentations, forcefully directed his group to follow a more sharply drawn line of inquiry. Asked if postdocs in his lab would write their own grant proposals to support their research and begin independent careers, he replied quite firmly:
I don't want to run my lab that way. I want to have control of things. A postdoc should remain for only 3 or 4 years and then go on his own . . . . It's the whole idea of the young people here to have relatively small science, to have a group of 10 to 15, where the boss is still in control of what's going on there. It's a good thing that we have control. (Junior scientist, private university, 1992) In some groups postdocs whose support originates outside the lab -who are not dependent on the lab leader for their salaries -are granted more autonomy than those dependent on the lab for support (Owen-Smith, 2001 ). Seniority also brings some autonomy, particularly during 'someone's second postdoc, especially when he's brought the preparation in, it's very difficult to insist on a set of experiments that I think are better than what he thinks should be done' (Senior scientist, public university, June 1994). But in other groups:
It doesn't make that much difference where the money comes from. Everything that happens in the lab is the consequence of a discussion between me and the postdocs. If they really want to do something I don't want them to do, no matter where they're paid from they don't get to do it. That's the way it is: it's my lab. They can't sit here and do experiments that I think are useless. It still costs me for them to do experiments. First of all, they take up a bench that could be taken up by somebody else that's doing experiments that I like. And secondly, it costs me [US]$20,000 a year to support their experimental work, apart from their salary. It's still, you know, it's my lab. It's not a democracy, no way. (Senior scientist, private university, July 2000)
The naive interviewer asked how this direction was communicated to the group, saying that surely the lab head did not go into the lab and give people direct orders. She replied:
Yeah, I do sometimes. I don't have a problem with being autocratic. I mean, it's my lab, they come to work with me, and they're my colleagues. I'm in charge of this lab. It has to be that way in science. You can't do science in a democratic way, because it has to be one way of thinking. Maybe the wrong way of thinking, but it has to be one line. It has to be a consistent logic, an approach of testing one line of models. If somebody goes and tests a model that's all the way to the right or to the left from what I think, it's not going to work. I mean, they'll probably sneak in one or two experiments that I really don't like, that I really don't think are very useful. That's fine. But to initiate a whole program of something that I The challenges of identity and control persist throughout the life course of a research group. Meeting these challenges is an ongoing accomplishment that requires continual attention: there is no single successful pathway but an array of choices must be made and remade between inconsistent but attractive courses of action. As John Servos (1993: 12) observed about the leadership of research schools, 'the very same factors that can lead to prosperity in one setting can be liabilities in another'.
The challenges of remaining active and credible as a researcher while doing the articulation work essential to run the lab are enduring concerns for research group leaders that may intensify over time. Precisely because the burdens of advising, administering, grant-getting, reviewing, and the like increase over time and draw maturing scientists away from bench work and the sentient understanding and tacit knowledge it provides, senior scientists are most severely challenged by the changing technologies of research.
One such scientist with a distinguished record of accomplishment and administrative experience added to the group a graduate student and a postdoc who moved the lab's research agenda in a new direction. While the new research questions and techniques they developed marked 'a logical direction for the lab to go', they also posed significant difficulties, because in this area of research the junior scientists have:
outstripped me in terms of techniques involved. It's something where they have learned them and use them every day, and I don't. I've learned them, but I'm not nearly as facile with them as they are. So it's uncomfortable for me to feel actually insecure, even to deal with people in your own group. I ask the biological questions, [but] when it comes to solving technical problems, I'm not much good at this . . .. It makes me feel insecure, especially about writing a renewal grant, which I have to do next year [when the junior scientists may have moved on to permanent positions]. Even if they are here, I don't feel it's safe to turn over the writing of the grant to someone who doesn't have the perspective and background that I have. I know the biological questions I want to ask, but I would be very insecure in writing a grant methods section . . . . The field has moved so much that the technical approaches one has to use now are ones that I just don't feel comfortable with.
Molecular biology is much more accessible as a tool and much more applicable to problems than it was a few years ago, but the people who know it are the students and postdocs, who've just been trained in it. The rest of us know that it's out there, and that in principle one can do this. . . . I've been trying to do it on the side, and it's not been as successful as one would like. I know a lot of the vocabulary. I know a lot of the principles, what can be done, in many cases. But the actual doing it, which turns out to be critical if you're writing a description of the methods, or if you want to actually make something work, the actual doing it is something you have to be familiar with.
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It's an interesting feeling: it's like being a student again, having lots of responsibility and no one actually teaching. It's fun, too, to use and gradually learn the techniques. It's good for students in a sense, too, to feel that they're teaching you something. It's always a milestone in a graduate student's career when they suddenly realize that they know what they're doing better, that they understand more about the system, than the professor does. And that comes on almost anyone's project, when they're doing it day in and day out, pretty soon they just have an understanding of it that surpasses your own. You can still guide it . . . but they become better at any given manipulation, and when they do, selfesteem and confidence go up enormously. (Senior scientist, public university, 1994) So the senior scientist's insecurity is the price paid for the younger scientists' growing competence and confidence, and the loss of erfahrenheit erodes both ability and authority. Craft and articulation work are not opposites but complements, and in the absence of the craftwork some other way of knowing must substitute. While the leader's biological judgment complements the technical skills of the junior scientists and offers perspective on the work and its significance, his insufficient sentient and tacit knowledge of their research ensemble reduced his ability to think and write effectively. As his laboratory craft skills have obsolesced so also has his ability to control group members and shape the group's identity. He asked them to study a phenomenon that was 'not easy to get, but you can'. However, they got very independent, those two. They did a few experiments in that direction [which the lab head had indicated], but then got off onto [another line of work]. These are interesting questions, too. But a couple of years ago [a professor at another university] did the experiment that I urged [the postdocs] to do and found a very exciting finding that blossomed into a major field now . . . . It's something we might have gotten, if we had the sense or drive to pursue it more thoroughly. Of course, it might not have proved interesting at all. But it turns out to have been extremely interesting. [The professor] has, during that last 2 or 3 years, had about eight Science and Nature papers, based on work he's done with this preparation . . . just looking at properties of the synapse, which is something we should have done 5, 6 years ago. (Senior scientist, public university, 1994) But strong control over research directions does not always bring success. One lab head virtually forbade a postdoc from pursuing two promising lines of research because they were so socially and politically sensitive that he feared the work would endanger the lab's funding. (One experiment concerned gender differences in human brain structure, the other also involved human brains and required handling tissue potentially infected with HIV.) Despite strong discouragement, the postdoc completed work on gender differences in the brain and prepared a manuscript, but others published first and more prominently on the topic. According to the postdoc:
I didn't want to work on just the rat . . . I wanted to jump into the human . . . . But [the professor] did not like that idea too well, so I had to have all these side projects with rats. Somehow I kept getting data with the human work, and it took a long time to complete each human study successfully, to collect a lot more data, [to] really do things correctly. When I got a hint that I was going to get positive data out of it, I somehow dropped my rat work and moved into the human field and did a series of studies . . .. The paper was written and [the professor] wouldn't even read it until after this other paper was published [by a group with a similar finding: in effect, he waited to be anticipated]. And then we tried to submit it to Nature, but by then it was too late to get a first-rate publication . . . . They wouldn't take it as the result had already been published. We spent four more years trying to get it published. (Postdoctoral scientist, public university, 1994) Why did he delay?
To avoid controversy. Because it was believed at that time that human brains were very similar, and any demonstration of sex [differences] would be flirting with [controversy, and the lab head] didn't really want to face the controversy . . . . He wanted them to be first . . . . They would sort of break the ice. (Postdoctoral scientist, public university, 1994) When asked why she was not furious -she could have published this work long ago and launched her career -she replied:
In a sense it was my fault for not being more aggressive. I mean, I could have pushed it and gotten my way . . . . So I do blame myself, though I didn't tell him that. I should have been a little faster. I was naive. I was ignorant . . . . I can't really blame [the professor]: he was giving good advice. He believes when you get a PhD you should be experimenting, and you can't experiment on human subjects. So in a sense he was giving good mentor advice. He was genuinely concerned about bad publicity . . ..
If he doesn't want to do something that would jeopardize his lab, jeopardize his career, that's not too selfish, that's reasonable . . . . We laugh about it now: that was not a correct call . . . . He would have rather been first . . . . He made a mistake, and I probably should have been more assertive. (Postdoctoral scientist, public university, 1994) The postdoc's interests are at odds with those of the lab head. While a major finding would be valuable even for a well-established scientist's career, in the leader's judgment the potential jeopardy to the lab's longterm funding that would result from controversy outweighed the potential personal and collective benefits of priority and recognition. But for the postdoc the downside of this risk is not very steep (there is little reputation to lose and early missteps may eventually be forgiven), whereas there is substantial recognition to be gained and the prospect of a long career during which to enjoy it. There is a methodological issue as well: in the leader's view, control of research subjects and experimental treatments is the essence of science, so problems that cannot be addressed with a strong experimental design and a relatively free hand for imposing treatments and F i r s t P r o o f choosing controls are not worthy of scientists' efforts (and the doctoral degree). In contrast, two of the professor's postdocs, interviewed separately on three occasions, agreed that problems with great social importance are worthy of research, even if the treatments and controls of classical experimentation cannot be employed.
The calling of science is imbued with motifs of craftwork, while practice of the profession depends upon managerial skill and articulation work. Each marks a polar form of control over research materials and practices in a group: at one limit are practices performed by the leader's own hands, at the other, practices that the leader is incapable of performing but nonetheless controls, depends upon, and owns.
Dimensions of Risk
Students are less likely to take risks in research or engage in long-term research than are professional scientists. They have a precarious status, one in which they receive few material rewards, and they therefore usually desire to obtain a degree in as short a time as possible. (Hagstrom, 1965: 136) A graying scientific community affects the rate of scientific discovery both directly and indirectly. The direct effect . . . is that older scientists, particularly those capable of making major discoveries, appear to be less productive than younger scientists are . . . . Indirectly, an older scientific community can depress the rate of scientific discovery by affecting the speed with which new ideas are integrated into scientific theory and practice. (Stephan & Levin, 1992: 74) Risk is a central theme in the ideology and practice of science and policy for science. We celebrate heroic accounts of scientists who take risks pursuing ideas that others think unlikely to succeed, and the rhetoric of science funding policy abounds with praise for high risk/high reward investments. In this context, changes in the age and career structures of scientists raise grave concerns. Some analysts argue that senior scientists are averse to risk, while others, in contrast, worry that career insecurities cause junior scientists to avoid risk.
In this section, I examine the sorts of risks groups face, suggesting a typology that explains the apparent paradox of risk -why it is risky not to take risks -and explore the interplay of seniority and risk within research groups. In brief, I argue that what matters is not the age of individual scientists but the risk profiles of groups, which are shaped by interactions between scientists at different phases of the career. There are good reasons why senior scientists would take on riskier problems than their junior colleagues: routine publications have little incremental value for established reputations, but greater incremental value for nascent reputations. But senior scientists face greater downside risks from certain sorts of failure (or certain sorts of success, as in the brain research example of the preceding section), whereas junior scientists can expect to have more time to make up for failure or reap the benefits of a gamble that pays off F i r s t P r o o f (Bourdieu, 1975) . A group's risk profile takes shape through the interplay of such tensions.
All scientists were conversant with the language of risk, and all said that they maintained a mix of projects that were certain to yield publications and others that were more speculative. Scientists who tilted the balance away from the speculative end were sometimes surprised to discover that in doing so they had, in fact, taken a substantial risk. A midcareer professor had enjoyed 6 years of funding from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), overlapped by two 2-year grants from the National Science Foundation (NSF). This level of support advanced his career from the initial faculty appointment through tenure. But shortly after he received tenure a series of his continuation proposals were declined because:
I was doing experiments where I was very confident they would work out and fairly confident what the answer would be. Frankly, it got to be a little ho-hum. It was good work, but the science wasn't exciting to me or to the people who would read it. It was right, it was solid, but it was sort of, 'Well, yeah, we expected that . . . . ' It was always sort of good, solid work . . . sort of a good round steak. But then after a while people got bored with round steak, and actually I did, too. The work has held up but it just hasn't been breakthrough stuff. It hasn't had the impact . . . . In a funny way, I think I was well served by the absence of [continued] funding on it. It has helped me personally and professionally. (Senior scientist, public university, 1994) By choosing to continue a line of investigation that presented little apparent risk, the researcher unexpectedly placed his group in jeopardy. When funding for this 'good, solid work' ended, the group disbanded. The scientist then invested significant time in developing new craft skills in another lab and during a sabbatical, and on his return for a time obtained research materials and assistance by collaborating with funded scientists on campus. By doing so, over a period of a few years he migrated to a 'hot topic' where:
probably for the first time I don't really know what the answer is . . . . It may be an act of God [that a particular event happens during development] . . . . It's a risk that I'm now chasing after this enzyme and it's possible that it's not involved at all -that it's epiphenomenal. I don't know . . . . I believe it's understandable, and the chase is fun. (Senior scientist, public university, 1994) The risk preferences of scientists within a research group may vary according to position or seniority, but the risk profile of a group forms through interaction among members of different ages or statuses (Dunbar, 1995) . Senior scientists may prefer problems that offer considerable acclaim for success, despite high risk of failure, because the lesser rewards of routine publications have little value for their established careers. Junior scientists, however, who must build publication records to achieve escape velocity from the gravitational pull of their graduate and postdoctoral advisors, may
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prefer problems that offer a higher probability of success, even if less important to the field.
A senior lab head kept two postdocs at work for several years in pursuit of an important and original finding, dissuading them from following alternative lines of research that arose during the study. Throughout the years of uncertainty the junior scientists feared they were wasting their time and looked with envy at others within the lab who appeared to have received more tractable and productive projects. In reflection, one said:
Once you're over it, it doesn't seem so bad after all. But at the time there were a lot of desperate moments when I thought I should change projects, find something that's not so difficult. The other thing about screening [for genetic mutants] is that you don't know that you're going to come up with anything . . . . [If this screen hadn't succeeded, then it would be] 3 years into my postdoc and I'd have to start another project. (Postdoctoral scientist, private university, 1993) A second postdoc, who joined the project a year after it began, waited in line for the first-authored publication that would provide the escape velocity needed to obtain a faculty job. The project had produced two prominent papers, with a graduate student and another postdoc in the first-author positions (and the lab head last, as is customary in this field), but that was not yet enough: because at this point there are three, maybe even four people involved in studying this mutant, and [another postdoc] and I would both like to get a first-authorship paper out of it. She arrived in the lab about a year before I [did], so she is probably going to get the first publication on the mutant, and I'm hoping to get something out of this [related aspect of the research], and then there's a graduate student . . . who's starting to use this mutant in her studies, so she's hoping to get something out of it as well. And perhaps another postdoc in the lab, too . . . [expects a coauthorship].
[Getting sufficient published credit for the work] is a little bit of an issue because journals would want to see everything thrown together in one paper, and it's definitely important, I feel, to have first-authorship papers. It just keeps the atmosphere a little bit tense at the moment.
[Laughs] If we get three or four papers, there shouldn't be any problems . . . . I never imagined I'd have to worry about authorships on papers . . . you have to stand up for your rights, to get the credit you deserve, or think you deserve . . . . That's a little bit demoralizing. (Postdoctoral scientist, private university, 1993) Tension about authorship credit created 'cooperative competition' within the group, a strong motivator that is also potentially distracting and disruptive Atkinson et al., 1998; Hackett et al., 2004) . As events unfolded, the postdoc's first-authored paper was published 3 years after the first pair of papers and 7 years after he joined the group, and he went on to an independent academic career.
To a senior scientist, several years of work -particularly, several years of someone else's time and effort -may seem a reasonable price to pay for the chance to make a significant discovery. (In fact, some senior scientists speak of 'postdoctoral years' as a commodity, with a typical usage being 'I will put 3 or 4 postdoc-years into that project, and if nothing pans out we'll give up on it'.) But a new doctoral scientist does not view his or her labor as a commodity: he or she is betting a career on the outcome of the study, and even if the project succeeds the postdoc has paid for that success with forgone income, security, and opportunity to do a different project. Only a senior scientist would have the career security and laboratory resources to embark upon a 5-year exploration, and perhaps only a senior scientist could remain heavily invested when progress is disappointingly slow and attractive alternatives appear, yet only junior scientists could come to the lab every day to do the tedious but essential work of mating and sorting Drosophila.
What did the postdocs receive in return for their investment? Science Citation Index® shows that from 1992-98 the group published 11 papers concerning this gene: five in Science, two in Cell, two in Neuron, one in the EMBO Journal, and one in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA. By June 2004 these 11 papers had received 1595 citations, an average of 145 each (with individual papers ranging from 34 to 232). The senior postdoc, who was first to enter the lab, is credited with seven publications from this project: three as first author (451 citations), three as a middle author (395 citations) and one as final author (128 citations). The postdoc who arrived a year later (and waited 3 years longer for his major first-authored paper) appeared on six papers, with two first authorships (320 citations) and four as a middle author (669 citations). The graduate student was the first author of two papers (242 citations) and appeared on a third (32 citations).
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Citations alone do not adequately reflect the enduring strategic importance of the work. When big risks pay off they not only produce publications, they also open spheres of inquiry that enlarge the group's identity and perhaps create the nucleus of a research school (Geison & Holmes, 1993) . For example, two postdocs and four graduate students had done substantial work on the clock genes. By mid-2004 both former postdocs were working on research problems closely related to clock genes, one as a professor at top-tier medical school, the other as an assistant professor at a second-tier research university. One graduate student is an assistant professor and laboratory head at a prestigious research university, using Drosophila as a model system for problems unrelated to circadian rhythms. Two other graduate students are in postdoctoral positions, one closely concerned with circadian rhythms in the fly, the other not. In all, three of six developed careers substantively derived from this research, and the work of a fourth is more distantly related. Such successes result from an explicit strategy to open a sphere of inquiry and create a technical advantage for exploring it, which may entail delaying publication and a formal priority claim, accepting the attendant risk of anticipation:
You've got two extremes: you could find this thing on day one, and on day two publish that you've found this thing. That would be a very thin publication, it would not tell anybody much, but it sure as hell would give
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everybody the opportunity to take advantage of this discovery and capitalize on this discovery. And as a postdoc it wouldn't be in your interest to do that: you'd like to spend the next year-and-a-half learning something about the gene. Otherwise, you spent the last 2 years isolating something that nobody else has to put any money into doing . . ..
If it takes you a couple of years to go through the agony of finding one of these genetic mutants, then you'd be very foolish [to publish immediately] . . . . It's tremendously labor intensive: you've got to put flies in, you've got to monitor 'em, you spend all this time testing chromosome after chromosome. You'd really be quite foolish, every time you got something, to write down, 'Well, here's three simple, superficial characteristics; it looks interesting, now somebody else can work on it. I'm going to look for some more.' That's not why they do it. The postdocs are interested in putting forth the effort only if they have an opportunity, once they've gone through that effort, to analyze what it is that they've put out . . . . (Senior scientist, private university, 1992) By giving talks without publishing, the lab put its results into circulation and staked an informal priority claim while gaining a head start in the research area. Delaying publication resolved a conflict between obligations to lab members to create a recognized, protected, and heritable research space, and to the community to share results and research materials, sparing others potentially fruitless or duplicative effort. As the lab director said, 'Once you know enough about it that it seems to be time to publish something, then the appropriate thing to do is to share what you've got so whatever you've reported can be reproduced'. In his view, talking about results before publishing them keeps the lab on the private side of the ethical threshold and does not violate the obligation to share materials and procedures.
Both postdocs concurred, with one explaining the technical uncertainties that persuaded them to delay publication:
What's really interesting now about this new mutation is that it turns out to interact with the previously existing clock gene, which is per [the period gene]. There have been a few other clock mutations identified since per was discovered, but there's no evidence linking any of them to per, putting them in the same circuit, let's say. But with this one now we have that kind of evidence. This gene knocks out the per gene oscillation . . ..
What we're doing now is to try to clone this gene. Even though we were using p elements to tag genes so that it would be easy to clone them, it turned out that this particular mutation that was caused in this gene was not caused by the p element. A lot of times when you do this mutagenesis you have secondary mutations that arise, and this is probably one of those secondary mutations . . . and it's not linked to a p element, so it's not going to be easy to clone it that way. It's not going to be possible to clone it that way . . . . So we have to clone it using conventional Drosophila genetic technology, which consists of mapping it relative to other markers [a procedure that is] very time consuming. We've got it down to about 150 kilobases from a known marker, but all that is based on genetic mapping, which is not terribly accurate. It could be anywhere from 100 to 200 kilobases away from this genetic marker. If we get lucky we could have it [the gene] in a few months. It could take even longer [a year].
We could go ahead and publish what we have already, which is the isolation of the mutant and the characterization of it, and the fact that it interacts with the previously existing mutation. And, we've been reluctant to publish it so far for a couple of reasons. First of all, we had this one manuscript which we were all ready to publish [about 3 months earlier] then we got this new data that shows it interacts with per, the previously existing clock gene [which is an important finding] . . . . And then a lot of other questions have come up since then, too, about just per itself. (Postdoctoral scientist, private university, 1993) The other postdoc generally agreed with the strategy, but expressed some reservations:
The only reason we might want to hold back longer [on publication] -and this was initially why we thought we might hold back -is so that we can sort of get a head start on the cloning before we have to give the mutant out to other people . . . . Because once it's published, you are required [to give it out]. Some journals don't insist on it, but it's the decent thing to do. So it might help us to, like, make a little progress on that before we go out . . . . So a project sort of never really ends: even after we have this gene cloned and sequenced there's going to be a lot that has to be done later, like study the interaction with per, or figure out exactly what it does itself, or map this gene and figure out what the important parts are in it, see if it's conserved in mammals, and if it affects circadian rhythms in mammals. So there are like extensions of the same project: it just never ends. And at different points along the way you publish papers. (Postdoctoral scientist, private university, 1993) The postdoc's closing observation accords with the conclusion of Charlesworth and his colleagues that scientists seem to interrupt a flow of research to write and publish, but that their central concerns are to sustain, direct, and enlarge the flow of research (Charlesworth et al., 1989: 165-71 ; see also Latour & Woolgar, 1979) . By delaying publication, however, the group exercised exquisite judgment: after some time had passed without further success, isolation and characterization of the mutant nearly seemed worth publishing, and a manuscript was prepared. But when the interaction with per was established and other researchable questions arose, they withheld publication in order to clone the gene, planning to publish both papers simultaneously (which they did, as consecutive papers in Science). Presentations of the research may have served to stake claims, convey findings, and seek information from others in the 'core set' (Collins, 1985: 142-43) , without incurring the ethical obligation to share research materials. In such circumstances a refined and relatively unexplored morality governs what scientists say, request, and research : Kohler, 1994 Atkinson et al., 1998) . Fortifying such ethical strictures are the hard necessities of producing research instruments, materials, and reagents and acquiring the tacit and sentient knowledge essential for their use (see below for an extended example).
Leaders must 'identify important scientific problems and channel the group's efforts toward solving them' (Fruton, 1990: 3) , but doing so means taking on problems that may fail and accepting the consequences when they do. One lab head invested 3.5 postdoc-years of two persons' time, plus a considerable amount of his own work in the lab, to knock out the genes that control phosphorylation in a plant model system. He tried to do the project on his own, knocking out four of the 13 genes himself, but it was a 'problem for me trying to pretend I'm still a graduate student when I'm not . . . I don't really have the time to do it. I can do it up to a certain point, but not all the way. I don't have the energy'. So he assigned first one and then another postdoc to work on the project:
. . . and if you asked me right before I knocked those sites out, 'Is this project gonna go all the way?' I'd go, 'Yeah, this is gonna go all the way.' . . . all the way up to site 7 or 8 I was still sure it was going to work. But once we were most of the way done, I felt so bad [for the postdoc still working on the project]. You've knocked out twelve sites and nothing's happened. All the regulation's the same. The phosphorylation goes away, because there are no sites, but all the biology's the same. Nothing's happened. Well, you've gotta knock out the last one because, maybe . . . and she did it, and she did the results, and she hardly even bothered to tell me that it didn't do anything. It was so obvious that it wasn't going to do anything. And she did them all -she was an honest woman, and she had to do it. But, God, I was sure that thing was going to work out. (Junior scientist [now senior], private university, 1999) Neither postdoc who worked on this project went on to develop an independent career. One worked for a drug company, the other is raising a family.
In contrast, when a big risk pays off the outcome can be unexpected, spectacular, and enduring:
Our major breakthrough was in '95 [5 years earlier], when we isolated the first mammalian telomeric protein, and after that we started rolling. We got one after the other. And, you know, studying those proteins functionally is basically the focus of this lab and it's told us a huge amount about how telomeres work, but we're not done. We just keep on doing the same thing. You're hitting this lab at its most . . . what probably will be . . . its most successful peak . . . . Nobody can do anything wrong here . . . . Whatever they do, it works, and it's interesting. (Junior scientist [now senior], private university, 2000) During an interview conducted 6 years earlier, just before the 'breakthrough', the lab was working on three different problems: one focused on the enzyme telomerase, the second involved inserting DNA into cells growing in culture, and the third concerned telomeric proteins in mammals. The one that eventually succeeded most spectacularly was the least promising at that time. Both postdocs thought it would not work, and in any case would not yield anything worth knowing. So the leader had difficulty persuading them to take the risk: 'That project was something that nobody in my lab wanted to work on . . . . I could do it with, like, new students, or sort of naive ones or technicians who just have to do what I say.' Then why pursue it? I thought it would work and I thought it would be interesting, but I didn't have very strong arguments. When I interviewed [for a job at a prestigious
university] I told [a prominent scientist there] about this protein, that very protein we were after, and he said, that, you know, 'Why would you want to do this in mammalian cells? It's all been done, or being done, in yeast. It's a much better system. Don't do this in mammalian cells.' I don't know. I thought it would be interesting to do the same thing people had done in yeast in mammalian cells, and it turned out to be right. It turned out that the whole complex is different. You can't just extrapolate from yeast to mammals. It turned out to be right, but I'm not saying that I had this grand vision. Not at all. I'm just really bloody lucky. (Junior scientist [now senior], private university, 2000) In this instance luck took the form of intuition, persistence, and shrewd strategic judgment about the likely impact on the group of success or failure.
11 But luck and the intuitive attraction to a new line of research were accompanied by a significant push away from the more widely accepted study of telomerase, which was:
. . . unbelievably competitive. Everybody's working on that enzyme, telomerase. So I stopped working on that enzyme because it was really competitive, everybody was working on it, and I had a small lab then and didn't think I could be competitive in that context. Strong competition, particularly from larger groups, brought the risk of being anticipated and drove this group away from a 'bandwagon' project.
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The group's second main project 'was finished and informative': it led to a publication but did not generate a novel research ensemble or new research problems. But the third project, which had a substantial risk of yielding nothing, and which no one within the group would willingly pursue, basically created our success. I did talk a technician through it, we did purify the protein she was after, and we did sequence it and clone it and it turned out to be incredibly important and interesting. And using that gene we then could go on and get a lot of other genes that encode proteins that interact with telomeres. So, you know, we cracked open a field with the work that technician was doing.
There was no such protein before. It was the first, and because we had one protein, it became relatively easy to get all the others. Because all the other proteins interact, or they look similar . . . 'Cracking open' a field means creating a protected sphere of inquiry by producing a novel phenomenon and devising the tools needed to study it. Doing so creates a form of cultural capital that the group can share, deploy, invest, bequeath, and convert into other resources (Collins, 1998) . But cultural capital must be managed wisely, as the moral economy of science compels leaders to balance obligations to group members against obligations to the wider research community (Kohler, 1994) . The essence of this tension is embodied in decisions about when to publish results and incur the obligation to share research materials, because in some cases the effect of publication can be a rapid leveling of research advantage. As Atkinson and his colleagues report in their study of the myotonic dystrophy gene, '[i]mmediately after the discovery has been published, all similar research groups have the same knowledge about that specific phenomenon. Any marginal advantage, in terms of technique, timing, or research material, is lost' (Atkinson et al. 1998: 280) . Similarly, Robert Weinberg's lament about competition arising from his discovery of the retinoblastoma gene in 1986, recounted in an interview with Joan Fujimura, provides an object lesson in the need to protect an opened sphere of inquiry:
Within months other people had jumped on it and begun doing interesting experiments and using reagents we did not have available at the time, which made them able to rush ahead of us, taking out of our mouths, as it were, our bread, in the sense that they could do things with our discovery that we couldn't. That's not my own peculiar history, that's the history of everybody who has made interesting discoveries. And now the field rapidly, within a matter of months, became very competitive, indeed so much that we were often frequently [sic] at a competitive disadvantage. And I was not at all pleased, nor were the people in my lab . . . . (Interview material quoted in Fujimura, 1996: 228) 13 In other fields, apparently, more flexible principles guide what research material is offered, requested, and provided. In the case of mammalian telomeres, for example, the problems are clear, the techniques are straightforward, and the work is important, so a bandwagon and its attendant competition should form rapidly. But a delicate balance of ethics and strategy prevent this, as explained in a scientist's account that is freighted with ambivalence:
Really, we've been uncommonly lucky in this whole business. There's huge interest in telomeres, right. But people that enter the field all work on telomerase. That's where they go. Hardly anybody works on the telomeric protein complex. Everybody's very interested in it, but when they want to work on these problems, they start working on telomerase. Why? I don't really know.
One of the possibilities is that we have a huge variety of techniques working daily in the lab, and we have all the reagents that you need for this kind of research. We have that because we generated them all ourselves. And many of these things are not commercially available. I send them out to whomever asks. We get like five requests a week or ten requests a week for reagents. I send everything out: cells, antibodies, clones, genes, and so on. But, you know, if somebody asks me for the whole shopping list -the 500 reagents you really need . . . . Let me tone that down a bit. I would say 100, yes, easily . . . easily 100. If somebody asked for that then I'd go, like, 'Hello?' [Laughs] 'What are you doing?' Nobody has the guts to ask that. I mean, if they ask for 10 things at the same time then we'll really get a little like, 'So, what experiment you going to do with all that?' So it's hard to get started de novo in this business. There's some labs that do it, and I cheer them on, because there's lots to do. I don't mind them in competition as long as they do decent experiments that I can rely on in my thinking. 
F i r s t P r o o f
The group leader certainly values having other groups work in the field, for competent competitors produce results one can rely on, and the mutually reinforcing combination of a greater volume of sound results and some urgency to produce and publish would lead to more rapid progress in the field Fujimura, 1996: 228-29; Atkinson et al., 1998) . Despite such advantages, however, there are countervailing advantages to restricting entry into the research sphere. Most notably, We don't have serious competition. We don't. And so we have the luxury of doing everything very slow. I'm very slow in publishing. Very slow. It takes us for-ever to get anything out. The latest Cell paper that just came out? I started writing that a year and a half ago . . . . I never got fully engaged in writing that paper until November or something, and I discovered what the gene was as I was writing the paper. The title of the paper is 'Identification of Human rap1', and we didn't know until I sat at the computer and looked at the sequence in November that we had been working on rap1 that we had been working on rap1 for 2 years. I mean, it wasn't easy to see what it was, it wasn't entirely obvious, you really had to look carefully at it. But it shows you . . . . If we had published this just at a snappy pace, because the competition is right behind us, we would have published it without understanding what the gene was. We would have later said, 'Remember that gene we cloned? It's actually rap1.'
We had a gene in hand that was very relevant in yeast, and we had the human version, and we had no idea that that's what we were working with. It was ridiculous. Even the postdoc who did the work had worked on that yeast gene as a graduate student, OK, and the first telomeric protein that I cloned I thought would be that yeast gene, and when it wasn't we were all very concerned that it wasn't that gene. This gene is very prominent in my mind, and yet we missed it, till the very end. Because we don't have that much competition we can be slow, and therefore we sometimes save ourselves from making total fools of ourselves. (Junior scientist [now senior], private university, 2000) In effect, the slower velocity of research is offset by increased quality and reduced error. Creating a space for research and developing a unique ensemble of technologies for exploring it create time, a research resource that may have been overlooked in the overriding emphasis given to priority in science (Merton, 1973; Charlesworth et al., 1989; Collins, 1998) .
Intense competition for priority in research on telomerase changed this scientist's risk calculus: this small lab would be at a serious competitive disadvantage in a priority race with larger groups that are working on clearly defined problems with well-established techniques. By comparison, the risk of coming up empty-handed in pursuit of the telomeric protein complex did not seem so great. One might say the lab's competitive strategy was to avoid competition, and its success created a sphere of inquiry that provided new opportunities, ample time and few competitors. Other groups are welcome to ask for components of the ensemble of technologies, but not for all (or even many) of them. Imposing such limits on both parties reduces competition and increases time available for the group's work, while not placing the leader in the ethically compromised position of appearing ungenerous, uncollegial, or uncommunicative (which could interfere with future exchanges within the field). The welldocumented need for tacit knowledge to accomplish replication (Collins, 1985) may not be the result of accidental incompleteness or the inability to explain subtle techniques in words, but may instead reflect a strategic reticence: just as scientists simultaneously keep secrets and disclose results, they also simultaneously share research technologies and hold them in reserve. When a research group opens a sphere of inquiry and develops the tools to explore it, they are staking a claim and attempting to control the population of other labs that work their claim. In some disciplines such claims are respected as a matter of right or propriety, whereas in others claims are competed or jumped (compare the Drosophila exchange network [Kohler, 1994] with oncogene research [Fujimura, 1996] ). Time and space for inquiry are secured by investing resources and taking risks; in turn, they may be converted into other resources, such as the ability to think through findings and avoid error.
A fourfold table (Table 1) summarizes some of the risks that arise from the choices leaders make. Problems generally recognized as important and doable -the well-structured problems of 'normal science' -carry the risk of being anticipated by others drawn to the same questions. Small groups tend to avoid such problems because they do not have sufficient personpower to win a priority race. In contrast, if the problem is important but generally recognized as not doable (that is, if success is highly uncertain), there will be less competition and significant rewards for success, but a distinct possibility of coming up empty-handed. But choosing problems that are relatively unimportant but doable does not eliminate risk, because trivial or uninteresting results will be ignored, and the reviewer community may eventually respond by withholding research funds or space in a good journal. Finally, the pursuit of an unimportant problem that may also be intractable is 'ritual' behavior -going through the motions of science -that is likely to be futile.
Research group directors continually and explicitly think about uncertainty, risk, and competition, adjusting their problems and approaches accordingly. Leaders of small groups choose problems and research approaches that suited their competitive advantages. One leader, for example, purposely chose a problem that put him in head-to-head competition with 
a postdoc from another lab, exploiting an advantage in ability and avoiding a disadvantage in numbers. Research problems entail different sorts of risks rather than simply different amounts of risk, and group leaders are continually evaluating uncertainties and balancing their risks.
Discussion and Conclusion
Research groups face an array of systemic tensions that must be navigated for the group to remain viable, and at every turn leaders face a question of balance: Allow autonomy or assert control? Create novel phenomena and tools for studying them, or address established problems with accepted methods? Rush to publish and claim priority or delay and build advantage? Share techniques and materials -and how much of which techniques and materials -or keep secrets and risk censure? Work daily in the lab to retain control of techniques, findings, and group members, or retreat to the office to write papers, reviews, and proposals? Retain a tight research focus or follow a strategy of laissez rechercher? The inherent and enduring tensions of research groups parallel the paradoxes, tensions, and ambivalences experienced by other groups and organizations (Smith & Berg, 1987; Quinn, 1988; Murnighan & Conlon, 1991; Cameron & Quinn, 1999) , but with novel features and implications imparted by the culture of science and the nature of research.
The first tension is between directing the lab's research and allowing autonomy and democratic participation. Effective string quartets, for example, espouse the principle of democratic participation but play with strong central guidance (Murnighan & Conlon, 1991) . In contrast, in science the reconciliation of this tension is more complicated because the principle of autonomy is deeply entrenched as a matter of values, as a feature of advanced research training, and as a way to benefit from the opportunistic mixture of knowledge and talent created by filter feeding and flux. Some lab heads give primacy to participation and scientific selfdetermination, 'muddling through' the consequences as they arise. Others are strong leaders, citing the need for unity, consistency of vision, and the importance of making progress. Still others compromise, guiding research with reason and persuasion. Each is aware of the losses associated with the choice made. No strategy prevailed in all cases, but the greatest successes and the greatest missed opportunities resulted from strong central decisions to commit to or to abandon a line of inquiry.
A leader who insists upon a strong, unitary line of research must recognize, reward, and retain members who provide essential services to the group, much as the second violin of a string quartet plays an essential part of the music yet receives less public acclaim than the first violin (Murnighan & Conlon, 1991) . Successful string quartets manage this paradox by bestowing on the second fiddle the internal rewards of recognition and collective support: all the world may acclaim the first violin, but within the group, members appreciate the second's crucial contribution.
F i r s t P r o o f
Also, in all quartets the second fiddle aspired to play first violin (Murnighan & Conlon, 1991) , just as a scientist in a supporting role strives to take the lead on the next paper, and almost all aspire to an independent career. With changes in the organization of science, including specialization, interdisciplinarity, increased scale and closer engagement with commercial and practical applications (Hackett, 1990 (Hackett, , 1994 Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al., 2001) , groups are becoming larger, more differentiated, and more costly to operate, increasing the number and proportion of supporting roles and exacerbating the tension of the second fiddle. Such changes are challenging current authorship practices, career patterns, leadership opportunities, and standards for credit allocation and personnel evaluation. There may be no better course of action than to embrace this essential tension: provide more latitude and reward for scientists in supporting roles (as there will be more of them and their work will be increasingly important for collective performance) while pursuing a clear and consistent vision for the group. Beyond the group, career tracks for such scientists will need to be institutionalized within universities and across the sciences.
Second, every sort of research is risky in some way, so scientists cannot choose between risky and safe research problems, only between problems that are risky in one way and those risky in another (Bourdieu, 1975) . The challenges of risk may take time to emerge -some lab heads do not encounter them until after tenure, when the research trajectory that carried them so far will take them no further. They discover the paradox of risk: a line of research that seemed less risky carried the greatest risks of all.
To work through this paradox requires choosing between answering research questions or forming research questions to answer; between studying phenomena or investing in the creation of phenomena to study and the means to do so (such as mutant species, assays, or instrumentation). Research technologies create research objects, and at their most successful they open spheres of inquiry and confer the benefits of time and opportunity to explore (Rheinberger, 1997: 28-37 ). For such reasons, the most intense and consequential competition in science is the competition to avoid competing: to create a sphere of inquiry and ensemble of technologies that pose further questions, that afford time to work without urgency, and (in the best world) that may be passed along to the next generation of scientists.
14 Third, research groups are places of inquiry and education, production and exploration, expertise and error, and these inconsistent purposes create role conflicts. Within groups, the roles of teacher and manager, student and employee, master and apprentice coexist and create tensions of strategy, purpose, and the wise use of space, time, and material. Such tensions are endemic to professional training of any sort -think about medical interns and residents, law students and junior associates in firmsbut have become more salient in academic science with rising standards of performance and accountability (Hackett, 1990 (Hackett, , 1994 ). In the role F i r s t P r o o f of teacher, a group leader may feel obligated to provide members with the freedom and resources to choose problems, explore original facets of work underway in the lab, develop distinctive ways to do so, and carry part of the research problem and associated technology into their independent careers. But the leader also has responsibilities to the group as a whole, to the university, and to the research sponsors, and these involve meeting timelines, allocating resources efficiently, adhering to the university's strategic goals, and marshalling members' efforts to meet these objectives.
Fourth, the tension of openness and sharing versus secrecy and protection forces scientists to balance the impetus to communicate findings and share methods and materials against the advantages of keeping findings and methods private long enough to complete a more thorough analysis, develop a more comprehensive explanation, and build a defensible sphere of inquiry for future research. The widely reported problems of replication may reflect not only the inherent difficulties of conveying tacit knowledge but also the strategic advantages of not doing so (Collins, 1985) . This is not a matter of choosing between the values of communalism and secrecy (Merton, 1973: 383-412; Mitroff, 1974) , but an essential ambivalence: a scientist must simultaneously communicate and keep secrets.
This tension is evident in the dynamics of cooperative competition (or competitive cooperation) within and between groups, which characterize relationships between postdocs in a group and between groups in a research field Mullins, 1973; Atkinson et al., 1998) . Within groups, centrifugal and centripetal forces are in dynamic equilibrium, posing changing problems of integration and focus: tighter focus may intensify competition, while looser focus may dissipate energy and relinquish fruitful synergies. Within groups there is also significant inequality of performance and productivity, with a minority of members responsible for the much of the group's output and reputation. Between groups, competitors are joined in a relationship of wary interdependence: each is the other's most expert audience and critic, and each stands ready to correct, contradict, confirm, or extend the other's results. Yet groups also need to establish and sustain independent identities, distinctive ensembles of research technologies, and protected spheres of research that distinguish them from others in the core set (Collins, 1985 Fujimura, 1996: 228-29) Researchers wish to be near others, but not too near; to interact, but not too often or too deeply. It is a strained symbiosis, guided by a flexible ethic of openness and reserve.
This tension also poses paradoxes for the decision to publish: researchers aim to be first in print with a new idea or result, a drive for priority that occupies a central place in diverse theories of science (Merton, 1973; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Collins, 1998) and may be crucial in certain fields of science at certain times.
15 But they also wish to take time to understand a novel phenomenon, develop a complete and convincing explanation of it (which may involve further characterization of the phenomenon to position the result properly within the field and avoid errors), formulate theoretical ideas or explanations, and establish a head start in studying the new area. The simple admonition to publish early and often is offset by a subtler imperative to manage time, technology, and the sphere of inquiry to best advantage. So the leader of a research group must choose between establishing priority or continuing to open a sphere, between publishing results and sharing materials or keeping a 'trade secret' and gaining advantage. The rewards of recognition garnered by answering research questions or asserting priority must be balanced against the productive advantages of opening a sphere of inquiry and staking a claim within. In practice, matters of ethics are entangled with considerations of strategy and tactics. If Hershey Heaven is 'to have one experiment that works, and kept doing it all the time' (Judson, 1996: 278) , then it must be very nearly heaven to open a sphere of inquiry, develop distinctive means for studying it, and have the luxury of time to explore.
Fifth, there are tensions between craftwork and articulation work, between the sentient knowledge (or erfahrenheit) acquired by hand and the intellective knowledge and detachment from daily lab obligations that create time and lend perspective to writing, reading, reviewing, reflection, politicking, and otherwise promoting the group (that is, articulation work). Paradoxically, a new group leader has achieved that position by virtue of craft skills, yet from that moment onward leaders generally are driven to spend less time developing and applying craft skills and more time doing articulation work (Fujimura, 1996) . That said, the incompatibility between craftwork and articulation work may be overstated: a group's existence depends upon its possession and mastery of an ensemble of research technologies, which includes not only methods, measures, and machines but also (and most critically) the understandings and interpretations that embed them in a scientific argument. Erfarenheit, the craft-based knowledge of research technologies, is the essential link between bench and desk. Throughout the career, the lab head's authority, control, and security depend to some degree upon retaining craft skills that complement lab members' deficiencies and that fill gaps arising when those with essential skills move on. Group leaders who lose possession of their labs' signature technologies must perpetuate those skills within the group and to understand them intellectively from a distance; those who retain craft skill do so at the expense of articulation work.
The problem of continuity amid change is another facet of this tension: ensembles of research technologies and the identities derived from them reflect large investments of intellectual, social, and financial capital. Research technologies impart momentum and path dependence, yet persistent effort is required to sustain them in the course of continual turnover in lab membership; changes in knowledge, technologies, research results and priorities in the field; and the usual (but not universal) migration of the lab head away from craftwork.
Sixth, advantage accumulates within groups, particularly within their ensembles of research technologies and the spheres of inquiry that they open . Groups can begin under quite similar circumstances and within very few years diverge dramatically in performance and recognition. Reputation, which resides in the collective opinion of researchers within a field, is an important form of scientific capital that is integrated into the cycle of credibility (Latour & Woolgar, 1979) . But this form of capital is crucially complemented by the material advantages bestowed by research technologies, spheres of inquiry, and a well-functioning group to employ them.
What is essential about these tensions, and what is gained by studying them? There is certainly descriptive and analytic value, at least to the extent that this perspective reveals new aspects of the organization and workings of research groups. And the essential nature of the tensions inoculates against facile advice about effective ways to lead groups. The idea of tensions revives some of the insights garnered from the long history of studies of ambivalence and paradox in science, yet avoids both the rigid necessities of functionalism (Merton, 1973; Mitroff, 1974) and the inherent indeterminacy of contingency and tinkering.
The various tensions experienced by research groups may be symptomatic of a fitful transition from one mode of research to another (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny, et al., 2001) , or may indicate that the two modes exist together -and perhaps always existed together -as simultaneous potentials. Rather than a wholesale shift from a science that never was to a science that may never be, there instead may be enduring, endemic tensions along cultural axes that characterize science and that exert continual pressure and admit no universal resolution (Hackett, 1990) . Science may be in oscillation or ambivalence rather than in revolution or transition. Tensions offer insight into why similar conditions may produce different patterns of organization and different outcomes: why all groups are not alike (and do not strive to be alike). Tensions are patterned and enduring, but the patterns are complex and interacting, so the merits of one tradeoff versus another may change according to place, time, or subject matter.
Science is rife with contradictory forces that tug on its practitioners. Scientists conceal methods and materials while disclosing them, open spheres of inquiry while settling disputes, collaborate competitively, direct democratically, and create stability amid change. Science is both the personal calling of Weber's essay (1946 Weber's essay ( [1918 ), with scientists absorbed in the research process and seeking the personal satisfaction of discovery, and gateways -often stated as 'forming, storming, norming, performing' that mark the progress of a group's development from stage to stage. 4. Chandra Mukerji called this a 'signature', emphasizing the functional and symbolic importance of research technologies for creating a distinctive signature or identity for a group, which in turn shapes its research investments and marks the path its inquiry will take:
Different laboratories each have their own set of techniques that they apply to a limited range of scientific problems. The range of problems and the techniques used to address them change (usually gradually) over time, but at any given moment they determine the analytic capacity of the laboratory. Each laboratory is known within the world of science for its own particular set of techniques. That's why I speak of them as 'signatures'. (Mukerji, 1989: 128) Mukerji underemphasizes the need for a group's research to connect with the traditions and themes of its field, a point recognized by Knorr-Cetina (1999: 44-45) and Hackett et al. (2004) . Epistemic cultures and ensembles of research technologies define and shape one another. 5. The idea that research technologies (or experimental systems or procedures) open spheres of inquiry was first proposed by Rheinberger (1997: 24-37) . As antecedents, consider Joan Fujimura's (1987 Fujimura's ( , 1996 extensive discussion of bandwagons and the construction of doable problems focuses on the process of creating sphere of inquiry. Similarly, Sjerp Zeldenrust observes that:
In an overwhelming majority [of cases], problems were generated within research groups. There is no evidence of any problem that was derived from a 'problem area' even remotely in the way that the problem choice [model of science] proposed . . . . [This] compels research groups themselves to engage permanently in problem-generating activity . . . [that] . . . often allows for problem specialization and subsequent specialization-based demand differentiation. (Zeldenrust, 1988: 288-89) Collins is emphatic: 'the most important [cultural capital] is that which facilitates one's own discoveries. Above all, it locates the intellectual territory on which work can be done. It does not merely solve puzzles but creates them . . . . Great intellectual work is that which creates a large space on which followers can work' (Collins, 1998: 32) . 6. There is a small but significant class of career technicians, some with doctorates or master's degrees, who remain with a group and constitute with its leader a small but coherent core. This is a class of scientist that is 'translucent' and under-researched, yet likely to increase in number and importance (see Hackett [1990] for more about scientists on the margins of academe). 7. To sustain the metaphors, one might say that newer lab heads lack the gravity to pull postdocs into their orbits; or, perhaps, they are not swimming with sufficient velocity to filter enough food to attract enough applicants to select the good ones. Then again, perhaps some metaphors are best not sustained. 8. A version of a paradox first observed by Groucho Marx: 'I don't want to belong to any club that will accept me as a member.' 9. Seven years later, when the research group had become conspicuously successful, the opposite problem emerged: 'Now I get applications from people who just see our papers and they think if the go to (our) lab they'll get a Cell paper and they'll get a job . . . . Now I really have to figure out who, of all the people that apply, are really interested in what we work on, or whether they're just interested in being in a hot lab so their careers get kick started' (Junior scientist [now senior], private university, 2000). 10. During this period, the same pair of postdocs completed a closed-ended research problem that determined whether a particular gene was expressed in the cell cytoplasm or in the nucleus. The problem was clearly doable: the research materials and
techniques were available, people wanted to know the answer, and the answer would be one or the other. The research produced a nice publication, but led nowhere. 11. But it is not always so, as the example of the recombination project and the transgenic mouse have shown. Indeed, one junior scientist remarked somewhat ruefully that he had had several ideas that were sufficiently sound and imaginative to be worth a Nobel Prize, if only they had had the decency to work out in experiments. 12. The paradox of being repelled from something precisely because so many others are drawn to it was stated quite concisely by Yogi Berra: 'Nobody goes there anymore; it's too crowded.' 13. In contrast to Weinberg's story, Fujimura (1996: 180) also tells of Kenneth DeOme, an inbred mouse specialist, whose retreat into very difficult work with inbred mice created a protected sphere of inquiry, but at considerable cost in risk, talent, and effort. 14. Mukerji (1989: 132) notes that laboratory signatures are 'at the heart of competition between scientists'. 15. Studies of science emphasize discovery and the race for publication and priority, which attract the attention of peers and earn reputational capital for the scientist. To Merton (1973) , for example, science is driven largely by individuals' quests for professional recognition, accorded by communal consensus using normative criteria (such as originality) and regulated by procedures (such as peer review). Randall Collins (1998: 44) states this view more starkly: '[m]odern science is competitive and fast-moving; only the first person to publish a discovery gets credit'.
